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THE AMENDED PROPOSAL FOR A FIFfH 
COMPANY LAW DIRECI'IVE-NIHIL 
NOVUM 
Daniel T. Murphy* 
The Commission of the European Communities has recently sub-
mitted to the Council of Ministers of the Communities an Amended Pro-
posal for a Fifth Company Law Directive1 concerning the management 
structure of companies. This Amended Proposal was subin.itted eleven 
years after the Original Proposal, ostensibly for the purpose of addressing 
some of the widely criticized features of that proposal. However, the 
Amended Proposal is not markedly different in substance from the Origi-
nal Proposal. The purpose of this article is to briefly analyze the 
Amended Proposal and to draw some general comparisons with United 
States corporation law. 
In order to assess the significance of the Amended Proposal, an 
overview of the role of the company law directives within the scheme of 
Community legislation is a prerequisite. Beginning in 1968, the Council 
embarked on a program to harmonize member states' company laws 
through the adoption of a series of directives. This effort was initially 
seen as a companion to the proposal for a Statute for European Compa-
nies.2 However, the proposal for a company law statute appears to be 
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean, University of Richmond. 
1. Amended Proposal for a Fifth Directive Founded on Article 54(3)(g) of the E.E.C. 
Treaty Concerning the Structure of the Public Limited Companies and the Powers and Obliga-
tions of Their Organs, 26 O.J. EUR. CoMM. (No. C240) 2 (1983). As published in the Official 
Journal, the original proposal for Fifth Company Law Directive (15 O.J. EUR. CoMM. (No. 
C131) 49 (1972)) and the amended proposal are set out in parallel columns, and the changes 
from the original are highlighted in the text of the amended proposal by the use of a bolder 
type. Throughout this article the amended proposal is referred to as the "Amended Proposal" 
and the original proposal as the "Original Proposal." The texts of both proposals, together 
with a brief explanatory memorandum by the commission [hereinafter cited as the Explana-
tory Memorandum], are also contained in 16 BULL. OF THE E. C. (Supp. 6/83) (1983). Refer-
ence throughout this article is to the text as set forth in the Official Journal. 
2. The Commission submitted a proposal to the Council for a regulation to adopt a 
Statute for European Companies in 1970, 13 O.J. EuR. CoMM. (No. C124) 1 (1970). This was 
amended by a proposal submitted in 1975, 8 BULL. OF THE E.C. (Supp. 4175) (1975). [The 
amended proposal for a Draft Statute is hereinafter cited as the Draft Statute for European 
Companies]. See Sanders, The European Company Law, 6 GA. J. INT'L. & CoMP. L. 367 
(1976); Hood, The European Company Proposal, 22 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 434 (1973); Com-
ment, 32 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 1 (1973); Sanders, Structure and Progress of the European Com-
pany, in THE HARMONIZATION OF EUROPEAN CoMPANY LAW, (C. Schmitthoff ed. 1973) 
[hereinafter cited as HARMONIZATION] at 82. 
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indefinitely postponed, if indeed it remains viable at all. 3 The series of 
company law directives appear now to be the main thrust of the Euro-
pean Communities' activities. In fact, the Amended Proposal incorpo-
rates many of the provisions of the Draft Statute for European 
Companies. To date, eight directives have been submitted by the Com-
mission to the Council. All but one, the Fifth, have been adopted by the 
Council. 
Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty of Rome4 charges the Council with 
the task of implementing a program to abolish all restrictions on the free-
dom of establishment within the Community. This concept, as well as 
the principles of free movement of persons, services and capital within 
the Community embodied in the Treaty of Rome, require that certain 
aspects of member states' laws, including their company laws, be harmo-
nized. As a result, the artificial but structural barriers which hamper the 
freedom of establishment movement resulting from the disparate com-
pany laws should be minimized. 5 The harmonization of company laws is 
only one of the several harmonization projects undertaken by the Coun-
cil and the Commission. 
Although the Treaty of Rome itself requires some harmonization 
and coordination of company laws, 6 more progress in this effort has been 
achieved through the issuance of directives by the Council. In fact, the 
Treaty of Rome itself requires that the Council act in this area through 
the issuance of directives. Articles 54(1) and (3)(g) of the Treaty of 
Rome set forth clearly the responsibilities of the Commission and the 
Council regarding the harmonization of company laws. These Articles 
impose on the Council and the Commission the duty of "co-ordinating, 
3. The European Parliament in its opinion with respect to the Original Proposal referred 
to the languishing status of the Draft Statute for European Companies. See Opinion of the 
European Parliament on the Proposal for a Fifth Company Directive, 25 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. 
C149) 20 (1982) [hereinafter cited as the European Parliament Opinion]. 
4. Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter cited as the Treaty of Rome]. 
5. See Schmitthoff, The Future of the European Company Scene, in HARMONIZATION, at 
1; Fielder, The E.E.C. Directives on Company Law Harmonization, in HARMONIZATION, at 66; 
Silkenat, Efforts Toward Harmonization of Business Laws Within the European Economic Com-
munity, 12 INT'L LAW. 835 (1978); Stein, Harmonization of European Company Laws, 37 L. & 
CoNTEMP. PROB., 318 (1972). In this article Professor Schmitthoff succinctly captures the 
pressures behind the movement to harmonize the company laws. He observes that unless the 
national company laws are identical on essential points, a migration of companies to the state 
with the most lax law will take place. He states: "If it may be said without giving offense to 
our friends in the U.S.A., the Community cannot tolerate the establishment of a Delaware 
within its territory. This would lead to a distortion of the Common Market by artificial techni-
calities." Schmitthoff, supra, at 9. 
6. For example, Article 220 of the Treaty of Rome requires the member states to negoti-
ate with each other regarding mutual recognition of companies, maintenance of the legal per-
sonality of a company when its registered office is transferred from one member state to 
another, and the possibility of merger among companies of different member states. 
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to the extent that it is necessary . . . , the guarantees demanded in Mem-
ber States from companies ... for the purpose of protecting the interests 
both of the members of such companies and of third parties. "7 As a 
complement to Article 54(1), Article 54(2) empowers the Council to is-
sue directives as a means of discharging its general responsibilities under 
Article 54. 
Procedurally, these company law directives are presented in draft 
form by the Commission to the Council. If the proposal treats matters 
within its area of responsibility, the Council must then seek advice on the 
text of the draft from the European Parliament, or the Economic and 
Social Committee. 8 The Commission may, if it chooses, amend the draft 
to reflect these opinions.9 Ultimately, the Council determines whether to 
accept, reject or return the proposal to the Commission. 10 The Council 
can amend the proposal and issue the directive in amended form, circum-
venting resubmission of the proposal by the Commission, but only if the 
Council members unanimously agree. 11 
Article 54(2) of the Treaty of Rome requires that the Council dis-
charge its responsibilities regarding the harmonization of company laws 
through the use of directives, rather than through regulations. 12 A direc-
tive sets forth the substance of the measure and is addressed to the mem-
ber states. The states are required to implement the measure by a certain 
date. The manner of implementation, whether legislative or administra-
tive, is left to the states. Consequently, the precise language of the imple-
menting legislation or regulation may vary from state to state. The 
directive is part of Community law insofar as it obligates the member 
states to act. But until the member states implement the directive, its 
provisions are neither effective as national legislation, nor do they bind 
1. Treaty of Rome, Article 54(3)(g). 
8. Treaty of Rome, Article 54(2). Articles 193-198 establish and set forth in general 
terms the responsibilities of the Economic and Social Committee. In 1982 the European Par-
liament finally gave its opinion on the Original Proposal; see supra, note 3. The Economic and 
Social Committee submitted its opinion in 1974. See, Opinion of the Economic and Social 
Committee on the Proposal for a Fifth Company Law Directive, 11 O.J. EuR. CoMM. (No. 
C109) 1 (1974), [hereinafter cited as the Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee]. 
9. In the Preamble to the Amended Proposal the Commission acknowledged that it had 
considered the opinions of these institutions. In the Explanatory Memorandum it stated its 
position on some of the recommended changes. See for example notes 30-32 and 71-72 and 
accompanying text. 
10. SeeP. MATHUSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN CoMMUNITY LAW, (3rd ed. 1980), at 
45-50; D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND INSTlTUTIONS OF THE 
EUROPEAN CoMMUNITIES, (1973), at 110-13; Schneebaum, The Company Law Harmonization 
Program of the European Community, 14 L. & PoL'Y. INT'L Bus. 293, at 296-300 (1982). 
11. Treaty of Rome, Article 149. It probably could not adopt an amended proposal 
which differs significantly from that presented to it without renewed consultation. See, 
Chemiefarma v. Commission, [1970] E.C.R. 661, [1967-1971 Transfer Binder] CoMMON MKT. 
REP. (CCII) 1J 8083; P. MATHUSEN, supra note 10, at 45-46. 
12. Treaty of Rome, Article 54(2); See P. MATHUSEN, supra, note 10, at 101. 
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the subjects of that state. 13 By way of contrast, a Community regulation, 
once adopted by the Council, is directly binding on the member states as 
a part of national legislation. 14 
Article 189 of the Treaty of Rome provides that a directive binds the 
member states "as to the result to be achieved while leaving to the do-
mestic agencies a competence as to form and means." 15 Notwithstanding 
this general statement regarding directives, the company law directives 
issued by the Council contain both general instructions to the member 
states to enact legislation regarding the matters covered by the directive, 
and substantive legal principles which the states apparently must enact in 
the same words. 16 This latter legislative approach, while not explicitly 
sanctioned by Article 189 of the Treaty of Rome, appears to be an at-
tempt by the Council and the Commission to achieve the desired uni-
formity within the Community. 
The First Company Law Directive17 contains examples of these two 
techniques. Article 2 reiterates that member states shall take measures to 
insure public disclosure of certain listed documents and various types of 
information. However, Article 9(1) of the First Directive sets forth a 
substantive company law principle regarding the doctrine of ultra vires. 
The article provides in part that acts of the company shall be binding 
upon the company even though the acts are not within its objectives. 
The mandatory character of this provision is highlighted by a concession 
in the second paragraph of Article 9(1) which allows member states, if 
they choose, to provide that the company will not be bound by such acts 
if it can prove that the third party had knowledge or could not be una-
ware that the acts were outside the company's objective. 18 If some states 
take advantage of this concession and others do not, the law with respect 
to the use of the defense of ultra vires against a knowing third party will, 
of course, vary from state to state within the Community. The Commis-
sion and the Council have apparently determined that the general princi-
ple regarding ultra vires is so critical that the goal of harmonization 
among the member states' laws regarding it can only be achieved by re-
quiring the states to enact the same exact provision. 19 However, the ap-
plication of this principle against a knowing third party may be less 
critical. Accordingly, the Council and Commission are willing to allow 
13. Treaty of Rome, Article 189; seeP. MATHUSEN, supra, note 10, at 101; Fielder, supra 
note 5, at 70-71. 
14. Treaty of Rome, Article 189; Leonesio v. Italian Ministry for Agriculture and Forestry, 
[1971] E.C.R. 287, at 295, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] CoMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1f 8175. 
15. Treaty of Rome, Article 189. 
16. See generally BULL. OF THE E.C. (Supp. 6/83) (1983), supra note 1. 
17. First Council Directive of9 March, 1968; 11 O.J. EuR. CoMM. (No. L65) 9 (1968). 
18. Id. at 12. 
19. See generally Fielder, supra note 5, at 66-71. 
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member states to modify application of the principle against a knowing 
third party. All of the company law directives, including the Fifth Di-
rective, are replete with similar substantive legislation. 
Following the mandate of Article 54(g)(3) of the Treaty, the Com-
mission has submitted eight proposals for company law reform; and 
seven of the eight have been adopted by the Council.2° Of those pro-
posed, only the Fifth, dealing with the internal structure of the company, 
has not been adopted. The time lapse since 1972 when the Original Pro-
posal was submitted and the relative progress made by the Commission 
and the Council with respect to the other seven directives evidence the 
concern about the Fifth directive as presented in the Original Proposal. 
Of course, some of the other proposals submitted before and after this 
one dealt with less controversial matters. 
The First Company Law Directive was issued by the Council in 
1968 and dealt with public disclosure of constitutive documents, financial 
statements and other information. The directive also dealt with the lia-
bility of individuals acting on behalf of a corporate entity before its for-
mation, the principle of ultra vires, and the nullity of the corporation 
under certain special circumstances. This directive was implemented in 
1969 and is the only one to have been fully adopted by the member 
states.21 The Second Directive was adopted in 197622 and was to be im-
plemented by 1978.23 It deals with the formation of companies, the 
maintenance and alteration of capital, payment of dividends and the 
aquisition of assets. The Third Directive was adopted in 1978, to be im-
plemented by 1981.24 It sets forth rules governing mergers and provides 
for an evaluation of the terms of the merger (including an evaluation of 
the fairness of any share exchange ratio) by independent experts. The 
states have not implemented this directive.25 The Fourth Directive26 sets 
20. For a brief description of the directives, see Schneebaum, supra note 10, at 302-21. A 
proposal for a Ninth Directive concerning the organization of groups of companies, and re-
quiring the parent to guarantee certain obligations of its subsidiaries has been under considera-
tion within the Commission for several years. This proposal has not yet been submitted to the 
Council. 
21. Scheebaum, supra note 10, at 301. 
22. Second Council Directive of 13 December, 1976; 20 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L26) 1 
(1977). 
23. In 1982, the Court of Justice of the European Communities held that four member 
states, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and Ireland, had failed to fulfill an obligation of the Treaty 
of Rome by failing to implement the Second Company Directive by the required date. See 
Commission of the European Communities v. Italian Republic, Kingdom of Belgium, Grand 
Dutchy of Luxembourg and Ireland, 1982-9 E.C.R. 3547, 3555, 3565 and 3573 [Transfer 
Binder 1981-83]; CoMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) ~~ 8917-20. To date these states appear not to 
have complied. 
24. Third Council Directive of 9 October, 1978; 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L295) 36 
(1978). 
25. See Schneebaum, supra note 10, at 303. 
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forth some accounting principles to be used in the preparation and pres-
entation of the financial statements required by the First Directive. The 
Sixth Directive27 creates a standard form of prospectus to be used by 
companies in their first public stock offering. The Seventh Directive28 
deals with consolidated accounts, and the Eighth Directive29 with the 
approval of auditors. 
In its original and amended forms the Fifth Directive deals with 
three substantive issues: the internal management structure of the com-
pany and managerial accountability, the general meeting of shareholders 
and certain shareholder rights, and accounting matters which relate to 
approval of annual accounts. 30 The first substantive issue, internal man-
agement structure and accountability as set forth in the Original Propo-
sal, was the source of greatest concern. That concern has been addressed 
only to a limited extent in the Amended Proposal. 
The Original Proposal required that companies adopt a two-tiered 
structure consisting of a management organ and a supervisory organ,31 
along the model of the German management board and supervisory 
board. 32 The mandatory nature of this structure coupled with the re-
quirement of employee participation in the management organ33 were the 
sources of greatest concern, especially from countries having no tradition 
of dual boards or co-determination. 34 In the Amended Proposal, the 
Commission appears to have offered an illusory compromise to the two-
tiered board and to have expanded the provisions regarding employee 
representation. 
In the Preamble to the Amended Proposal, the Commission recog-
nizes that within the Community there are basically two types of man-
agement structure: a one-tier structure comprised only of an 
26. See Fourth Council Directive of 25 July, 1978; 21 O.J. EuR. CoMM. (No. L222) 1 
(1978); CoMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 11 1371. 
27. See Sixth Council Directive of 17 March, 1980; 23 O.J. EuR. CoMM. (No. L100) 1 
(1980); COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 11 1411. 
28. See Seventh Council Directive of 13 June, 1983; 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. COMMON MKT. 
REP. (CCH) 11 1421. 
29. See Eighth Council Directive of 10 April, 1984; CoMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 111431. 
30. The term "annual accounts" is defined in Article 2 of the Fourth Directive to mean 
the balance sheet and profit and loss statement. 
31. Original Proposal, arts. 2-21. 
32. See generally E. ERCKLENTZ, MODERN GERMAN CORPORATION LAW, Vol. 1 (1979); 
Conard, Company Laws of the European Communities from an American Viewpoint, in HAR-
MONIZATION, at 45; Vagts, Reforming the "Modern" Corporation: Perspectives from the Ger-
man, 80 HARV. L. REv. 23 (1966). 
33. Original Proposal, arts. 4(2) & (3). 
34. See Conlon, Industrial Democracy and EEC Company Law: A Review of the Draft 
Fifth Directive, 241.C.L.Q. 348 (1975); Lang, The Fifth EEC Directive on the Harmonization of 
Company Law, (pts I and II), 12 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 155, 345 (1975). 
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administrative organ (board of directors) and the two-tier system com-
prised of both a management organ and a supervisory organ. The Pre-
amble then asserts that functionally even in the one-tier form "a de facto 
distinction is often made between executive members who manage the 
business of the company and non-executive members who confine them-
selves to supervision."35 The Commission concedes that to require all 
companies to conform to the two-tier system is presently impracticable, 
and it would therefore allow continued use of the one-tier structure. This 
concession, however, appears to be none at all, since to use the Commis-
sion's term, it has required a de facto two-tier format within the optional 
one-tier structure. 36 The Commission reemphasized its commitment to 
the two-tier structure in the Preamble to the Amended Proposal by stat-
ing that continued use of the one-tier structure would be acceptable pro-
vided it were "endowed with certain characteristics designed to 
harmonize ... [its] functioning with that of the two-tier structure."37 
The text of the Amended Proposal clearly carries out this close co-
ordination of provisions between the two-tier and the one-tier structure. 
Two chapters in the text of the Amended Proposal deal with manage-
ment structure. Chapter III discusses the two-tier system and Chapter 
IV discusses the one-tier system. Both chapters allocate management re-
sponsibility, set forth the means of assuring employee participation, deal 
with conflicts of interest and the oversight of responsibility, and provide 
for the creation and enforcement of liability. 
Within Chapter III, two main articles address the topics of manage-
ment structure and employee representation. Article 3 of Chapter III 
provides that a company shall be managed by a management organ 
under the supervision of a supervisory organ. It also provides that mem-
bers of the management organ shall be appointed by the supervisory or-
gan. Article 3(1) provides for the dismissal of members of the 
management organ. Whether dismissal may be effected with or without 
cause is not addressed in this Article. 38 Article 3(3), however, provides 
that the appointment and dismissal provisions of Article 3(1)(b) are tem-
pered by any national legislation regarding appointment or dismissal 
against the wishes of a majority of the members of the supervisory organ 
appointed by the employees. Because the laws of the member states will 
35. Amended Proposal, at Preamble. 
36. See supra notes 74 through 80 and accompanying text. 
37. Amended Proposal, at Preamble. 
38. The Economic and Social Committee suggested that, to increase the independence of 
the management organ, dismissal should only be for "grave reasons." Opinion of the Eco-
nomic and Social Committee, at art. 13. The European Parliament did not recommend any 
change to this article. The Commission did not address this issue in the Explanatory 
Memorandum. 
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generally determine the propriety of a dismissal, the opportunity for con-
flicting law on this point among the member states exists. 
Aside from specific provisions governing the reporting and approv-
ing of certain specified matters by the supervisory organ, there is very 
little treatment of the functions and powers of the two organs. 39 Appar-
ently, the proper roles for each will again be left for development by 
national legislation. This omission in the Amended Proposal is especially 
crucial for at least two reasons. First, far reaching liability sections 
would expose members of both organs to liability for failing to meet their 
responsibilities;40 yet little guidance is provided as to what these respon-
si'Qilities may be. Second, for those member states without a tradition of 
two-tier boards, there will be little pre-existing law which could be used 
to fill in the void caused by the Amended Proposal. A significant legisla-
tive effort will be required in these states in order to adequately imple-
ment the Directive. 
Article 4 of Chapter III elaborately details the methods for selecting 
the supervisory organ and of assuring employee participation. If the 
company, together with its subsidiaries, employs within the Community 
less than the number of persons fixed by national legislation (not to ex-
ceed 1,000), the entire supervisory organ may be appointed by the gen-
eral meeting of shareholders.41 Apparently, these companies need not 
make any provision for employee participation. But, if the number of 
employees exceeds that fixed by national legislation, employee participa-
tion must be assured by one of several means. 42 
As drafted, Article 4(2) requires that for those companies having the 
requisite number of employees worker participation in the appointment 
of members to the supervisory organ will be assured by one of three 
processes: direct appointment, co-optation, or collective agreement. Ad-
ditionally, these companies may assure employee participation in the af-
fairs of the company by a process which does not entail membership on 
the supervisory organ. 
39. In contrast, the Draft Statute for European Companies extensively treats the respec-
tive functions and powers of _pach organ (in particular, arts. 64 and 65 regarding the board of 
management's powers, and art. 73 regarding the supervisory board's function). See Sanders, 
Structure and Progress of the European Company, supra note 2, at 89-96. 
40. See infra notes 67-76 and accompanying text. 
41. Amended Proposal, art. 4(1). 
42. By making these employee participation provisions applicable only to the companies 
employing more than the threshold number of employees within the Community, Article 4 by 
implication makes them inapplicable to companies not meeting the threshold. Article 4(a) 
states that member states may provide that not more than one-third of the members of the 
supervisory organ of companies not meeting the employment threshold be appointed otherwise 
than by Article 4(1) (emphasis added). 
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This last alternative represents a change in the Commission's posi-
tion. Article 4 of the Original Proposal required that companies meeting 
the employment threshold assure employee participation by providing 
that at least one third of the members of the supervisory organ be ap-
pointed by the employees or that the employees have the right to veto 
unacceptable appointments to the supervisory organ.43 Interestingly, in 
the Explanatory Memorandum the Commission understates this soften-
ing of its position. It merely lists the four alternative means of employee 
participation. It fails to note that all four of these methods were not 
available under the Original Proposal. 
These new methods of assuring employee representation on the su-
pervisory organ are set forth in the Amended Proposal in Articles 4(b ), 
(c), (d) and (e). The member states are to establish in their national legis-
lation which one of these four alternatives will be available in their 
jurisdictions. 
Article 4(b) provides that the general meeting of shareholders ap-
point at most two-thirds of the supervisory organ members, and that the 
employees may appoint a minimum of one-third to a maximum of one-
half of the members of the supervisory board. The exact percentages 
would be fixed either by the company's constitutive documents or by na-
tional legislation. 
Article 4(c) would allow employee representation through co-opta-
tion, a procedure modeled after Dutch company law.44 Using this 
method the supervisory organ is self-perpetuating, and the existing mem-
bers appoint new members to fill vacancies. However, either the share-
holders or the employees may object to the appointment of an individual 
on the grounds that he is unable to carry out his duties, or that if he were 
appointed, "the supervisory organ would, having regard to the interests 
of the company, the shareholders and employees, be improperly consti-
tuted."45 If either group objects, the individual is not to be appointed 
unless an independent body determines the objection to be unfounded. 
While this method assures employees that individuals appointed will not 
be adverse to their interests, it differs from Article 4(b) which guarantees 
the right of employees to appoint their own representatives to the super-
visory organ. Article 4(e) allows employee participation in either of the 
43. On this issue the Amended Proposal does not follow the Draft Statute for European 
Companies. Article 74(a) of the Draft Statute for European Companies requires that one-third 
of the supervisory board be comprised of representatives of the shareholders, one-third of the 
employees and one third co-opted by the two groups. See infra note 47 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of the process of co-optation. 
44. See J. MA.EUER, A MODERN EUROPEAN CoMPANY LAW SYSTEM-CoMMENTARY 
ON THE 1976 DUTCH LEGISLATION (1978), at 302-05; Pickler, supra note 5, at 81. 
45. Amended Proposal, art. 4(c). 
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foregoing procedures to be regulated by collective agreements between 
the company and unions. 
A significant departure from the Original Proposal is the alternative 
method of employee participation sanctioned by Article 4(d). Although 
it does not assure employee representation on the supervisory organ, it 
does provide a vehicle by which they can voice their concerns. Article 
4(d) is based largely on the European Parliament's recommended modifi-
cations to the Original Proposal46 in that it assures employees an ongoing 
access to both the management and the supervisory organ as well as to 
extensive information. Article 4(d)(l) states that a representative body of 
employees has the right to information, to consult the management organ 
on "administration, situation, progress and prospects of the company, its 
competitive position, credit situation and investment plans."47 This 
group would also receive all information provided by the management 
organ to the supervisory organ, 48 would meet with the supervisory organ, 
and be provided with an agenda and all documentation provided to 
members of that body.49 Furthermore, when the supervisory organ is 
considering such matters as the closure, expansion or curtailment of op-
erations, or any major organizational change, it must consult with the 
representative group. 50 In the event the supervisory organ does not ac-
cept the group's opinion, it must state the reasons.51 
This information sharing and consultation procedure does not pro-
vide employees with the same direct participation as the appointment 
alternatives, when the civil liability and management objective portions52 
are considered. However, Article 4(d) could grant employees significant 
input into the management decision making process and afford them pro-
tection from managerial decisions adverse to their interests. 
It is interesting to compare these consultative provisions with those 
of the Vredeling Proposa/,53 which is separate from the Amended Propo-
sal. The Vredeling Proposal sets forth guidelines for sharing information 
46. European Parliament Opinion supra note 3, at art. 4(7) & (8). 
47. Amended Proposal, art. 4(d)(1). Articles 4(e)-(h) provide comparable rights of em-
ployee participation through collectively agreed upon systems. 
48. Amended Proposal, art. 4(d)(1); see notes 65-66 and accompanying text. 
49. Amended Proposal, art. 4(d)(4). The individuals receiving the information are re-
quired to exercise a certain, but not well defined, discretion regarding the information received. 
Amended Proposal, arts. 4(d)(3) and 10(a)(2) require those receiving the information to "exer-
cise a proper discretion in respect of information of a confidential nature concerning the 
company." 
50. Amended Proposal, art. 12(a)(1). 
51. Amended Proposal, art. 4(d)(2). 
52. See infra notes 67-76 and accompanying text. 
53. See Proposal for a Council Directive on Procedures for Informing and Consulting Em-
ployees, 25 O.J. EUR. CoMM. (No. C217) 3 (1983); 16 BULL. OF THE E. C. (Supp. 2/83) (1983), 
(hereinafter cited as Vredeling Proposal). The commission extensively set forth its views on the 
question of employee participation in Employee Participation and Company Structure in the 
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and consulting with employees. Its information sharing and consultation 
provisions are applicable when at least 1,000 workers are employed by a 
parent and its subsidiaries within the Community. 54 If both proposals 
were adopted, the covered companies would be required to implement 
the consultative provisions of the Vredeling Proposal regardless of the 
form of employee participation selected under the Amended Proposal. 
Under Article 4(d) of the Amended Proposal, employees are given 
the right to information and consultation with both the management and 
the supervisory organs with unspecified frequency. 55 The only limitation 
is that consultation with the supervisory organ should take place prior to 
each meeting of that body. 56 However, Article 3 of the Vredeling Propo-
sal states that information must be provided by management at least once 
a year.57 
The categories of information to which the employees would be enti-
tled are broader under the Amended Proposal. 58 While both require in-
formation and consultation regarding major structural or economic 
changes, the Vredeling Proposal's list of events which trigger these rights 
is more specific and more directly related to the interests of the work-
ers. 59 Finally, the confidentiality requirements are more stringent in the 
Vredeling Proposal. 60 
European Community, 8 BULL. OF THE E.C. (Supp. 8175) (1975). See Pipkorn, The Draft 
Directive on Procedures for Informing and Consulting Employees, 20 CoMMON MKT. L. REv. 
725 (1983); Note, The Proposed Vredeling Directive: A Modest Proposal for the Exportation of 
Industrial Democracy?, 20 VA. L. REv. 1469 (1984). 
54. See Vredeling Proposal, art. 2(1). 
55. Amended Proposal, art. 4(d)(1). This article states that the workers shall have the 
right to "regular information and consultation .... " (emphasis added). 
56. Amended Proposal, art. 4(d)(1). 
57. Vredeling Proposal, art. 3(2). 
58. Compare Amended Proposal, art. 4(d)(1) which states that information be provided 
concerning the "administration, situation, progress and prospects of the company, its competi-
tive position, credit situation and investment plans," with Vredeling Proposal, art. 3(2) which 
requires that information be provided regarding the "(a) structure; (b) the economic and finan-
cial situation; (c) the probable development of the business and of production and sales; (d) the 
employment situation and probable trends; (e) investment prospects." 
59. Compare Amended Proposal, art. 12(a) which requires that consultation take place 
with respect to "(a) the closure or transfer of the undertaking or of a substantial part thereof; 
(b) substantial curtailment or extension of the activities of the undertaking; (c) substantial 
organizational changes within the undertaking; (d) establishment of long term cooperation 
with other undertakings or the termination thereof;" with Vredeling Proposal, art. 4(2) which 
requires consultation with respect to "(a) the closure or transfer of an establishment or major 
part thereof; (b) substantial restrictions or modifications of the activities of the undertaking; 
(c) major modifications with regard to organization, working practices or production methods, 
including modifications resulting from the introduction of new technologies; (d) the introduc-
tion of long-term cooperation with other undertakings or the cessation of such cooperation; 
(e) measures relating to workers health and to industrial safety." 
60. Compare Amended Proposal, art. 4(d)(3) which provides that employees exercise 
"proper discretion in respect of information of a confidential nature concerning_ the company;" 
with Vredeling Proposal art. 7(2) which requires that "employees ... shall not reveal to third 
parties any information ... given to them in confidence." 
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The next series of provisions in Chapter III of the Amended Propo-
sal addresses substantive corporate law principles. The Amended Propo-
sal generally carries over these provisions from the Original Proposal, 
expanding the treatment given some of them. 
The first provision of the Amended Proposal treating substantive 
corporate law is Article 10 which deals with conflicts of interest. This 
Article provides that any agreement between the company and another 
entity in which a member of either the management or supervisory organ 
has an interest must be authorized by the supervisory organ. Notice of 
the authorization must be given at the general meeting. 61 The provision 
applies to every agreement in which a member has an interest and is 
unchanged from the Original Proposal. The Economic and Social Com-
mittee's suggestion that contracts in the ordinary course of business be 
exempt from Article lO's disclosure and authorization requirements was 
neither accepted nor addressed by the Commission in the Explanatory 
Memorandum. 62 Considering the fact that this provision will apply to 
members of both organs, and to direct and indirect interests, the possibil-
ity that the supervisory organ will be required to authorize and notify the 
general meeting of many routine agreements is likely. The Article does 
not state the consequences of noncompliance, except to provide that the 
transaction's validity will not be affected if the other entity is unaware of 
the noncompliance. 63 Presumably, a member who fails to disclose his 
interest, or does so but the supervisory organ fails to authorize the trans-
action, would be liable under Article 14, which provides that a member 
shall be liable for damage sustained by the company as a result of his 
breach of duty.64 This substantive conflict of interest provision is more 
expansive than that presently found in the laws of many member states. 65 
The Draft Statute for European Companies contains a similar provision 
which imposes liability for damages a company sustains as a result of a 
member's interest in the subject of a contract.66 
61. Amended Proposal, arts. 10(1), (3). 
62. Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, at art. 10. 
63. Amended Proposal, art. 10(4). 
64. Amended Proposal, art. 14(1). See notes 71 through 79 and accompanying text. Ar-
guably, if the arrangement was fair to the company there would be no damage to the company 
as a result of its performance. 
65. The member states have laws regulating at least some specific types of conflict of 
interest transactions; and some have fairly broad provisions. See generally, DOING BUSINESS 
IN EUROPE, COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH). France has a law similar to Article 10, which 
requires disclosure and approval of any agreement in which a director has a direct or indirect 
interest. It exempts, however, agreements in ordinary operations and agreements made in 
normal conditions. Id. at 11 22,736. 
66. Draft Statute for European Companies, arts. 69(4) and 79(3). 
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Article lO(a) of the Amended Proposal contains a significant princi-
ple of corporate law unrelated to conflicts of interest, which is not con-
tained in the Original Proposal. This provision is the only explicit 
statement in the Amended Proposal setting forth the obligations of the 
members of the management and the supervisory organs. First, it states 
that all members of each body should have the same rights and duties, 
even though certain functions of the body may be assigned to individu-
ally designated members. 67 It then provides that the members of both 
groups "shall carry out their function in the interest of the company hav-
ing regard to the interests of the shareholders and the employees."68 
Article l(a) of Chapter III establishes the two-tier system and 
broadly assigns the function of each body by providing that the manage-
ment organ operate under the supervision of the supervisory organ. Arti-
cle lO(a) coupled with the civil liability provisions of Article 14 
substantively defines the responsibility of each body.69 The explicit 
charge that members consider the interests of both shareholders and em-
ployees, while not surprising in view of the rights of employees as stated 
in Article 4 and the Vredeling Proposal, is thought provoking. It is espe-
cially interesting in light of the current debate in the United States over 
which group's interests the director ought to take into account in dis-
charging his responsibilities. 70 
67. Amended Proposal, art. 3(a) authorizes the supervisory organ to assign responsibility 
for personnel and employee relations to specified members of the management organ. 
68. Amended Proposal, art. 10(a)(2). 
69. In the Explanatory Memorandum the Commission noted that the European Parlia-
ment suggested the substance of Article lO(a). The text of the directive as amended by the 
Opinion of the European Parliament contained no such statement. Articles 70(1) and 80(1) of 
the Draft Statute for European Companies are comparable to Article 10(a). They provide that 
the members of the management and supervisory board, respectively, carry out their duties in 
a manner which promotes, or has regard to, "the interests of the company and of its 
personnel." 
70. See e.g. Symposium: Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 HAsTINGs L.J. 1247 (1979); 
American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance; Analysis and Recommendations, 
§ 2.01 (rent. Draft No. 2, 1984); Comment, Corporate Ethics and Corporate Governance: A 
Critique of the ALI Statement on Corporate Governance Section 2.01 (b), 71 CALIF. L. REv. 994 
(1983). For wide ranging discussions of the ALI's Corporate Governance Project, see 37 U. 
MIAMI L. REv. No.2 (January 1983); and Statement of the Business Roundtable on the Ameri-
can Law Institute's Proposed "Principles of Corporate Governance and the Structure, Restate-
ment and Recommendations" (1983). 
On this and many other points the Amended and Original Proposals and the Draft Stat-
ute for European Companies are similar to the German company law. See generally E. ER-
CKLENTZ, supra note 32. Mr. Ercklentz states that it is generally thought that the 
management board of a German AG must take into account the welfare and interests of the 
enterprise and its shareholders, and also that of its employees and the larger surrounding com-
munity within which it functions. Each of these interests is to be given equal weight in corpo-
rate decision making. Id. at 197. He notes that an older version of the German stock 
corporation statute explicitly stated that the management board, in performing its duties was 
to manage the enterprise in a manner consistent with the welfare of the enterprise and its 
employees, and consistent with the common interests of the people and the state. This explicit 
charge was omitted from the 1965 stock corporation statute. It was considered superfluous 
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Article 11 deals with the reporting requirements of the management 
organ and the overseer position of the supervisory organ. Article 11(a) 
requires the management organ to submit a written report to the supervi-
sory organ at least every three months regarding "the progress of the 
company's affairs.'m It also requires submission of drafts of the financial 
statements within five months of the end of the fiscal year.72 The super-
visory organ is empowered to request special reports from the manage-
ment organ and to "undertake . . . all investigations which may be 
necessary."73 Article 12 requires authorization from the supervisory or-
gan before significant structural or economic measures can be 
implemented. 74 
The civil liability provisions of Article 14 are a mix of substantive 
law and guidelines to member states to make provisions in their law to 
ensure as a minimum that "compensation is made for all damage sus-
tained by the company as a result of breaches of law or of the memoran-
dum or articles of association or of other wrongful acts committed by 
members ... in carrying out their duties.''75 This section does not con-
tain a substantive liability provision. Instead, it directs the member 
states to enact their own provisions, which must at least provide that 
compensation is paid for the damages suffered by the company. Article 
14(2) by contrast establishes a substantive liability for all members failing 
to meet the Article 14(1) standard. It states: "[E]ach member of the 
organ in question shall be jointly and severally liable without limit. He 
may, however, exonerate himself from liability if he proves that no fault 
is attributable to him personally.''76 
The severity of Article 14(2) is intensified by the other subsections of 
Article 14. In subsection (3) the liability provisions apply even when 
responsibilities have been allocated, as authorized by Article 1(3). Sub-
sections (4) and (5) state that authorization by the supervisory organ or 
the general meeting of shareholders of the questioned activities do not 
exempt members from liability. Understandably, the Original Proposal's 
version of these provisions evoked criticism from within and without the 
since such principles should be self-evident and consequently there was no need for their artic-
ulation. /d. at 196-97. By way of contrast, the new British company law for public companies 
states that directors are to consider the interests of the company and employees in discharging 
their responsibilities. Companies Act, 1980, Section ~6. 
71. Amended Proposal, art. 11(1). 
72. Id. art. 11(1). 
73. Amended Proposal, art. 11(4). 
74. See supra note 53. 
75. Amended Proposal, art. 14(1). 
76. Amended Proposal, art. 14(2). 
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Community.77 Nonetheless, the Commission must consider them ex-
tremely important because they were carried over from the Original Pro-
posal virtually unchanged. 
The Amended Proposal's liability provisions are comparable to 
those found in the Draft Statute for European Companies. 78 The Draft 
Statute provides that the management and supervisory boards are liable 
to the company for any loss resulting from their failure to observe provi-
sions of the statute, constitutive documents, or other breaches. Each 
member would be jointly and severally liable unless he can show that no 
fault is attributable to him.79 In order to escape liability, the member 
must notify the supervisory board, or its chairman, as soon as knowledge 
of the act or omission comes to his attention. 80 One significant difference 
between the Amended Proposal and the Draft Statute is that the latter 
contains a standard of care. Article 70(1) of the Draft Statute provides 
that the members of the management board shall exercise "the standard 
of care expected of a prudent administrator and shall promote the inter-
ests of the company and of its personnel."81 Article 80(1) does not im-
pose a standard on the members of the supervisory board, but requires 
that they discharge their duties with regard to the interests of the com-
pany and its personneJ.82 
Article 14 of the Amended Proposal seems to eliminate, by virtue of 
subsection (5), the concept of shareholder ratification. It is also unclear 
whether subsection (3) would allow the defense of reliance. Article 14 
apparently leaves to different national interpretation the question of what 
conduct constitutes a "breach of law" or a "wrongful act."83 Nor is the 
notion of the reasonableness of a member's conduct explicitly addressed 
77. Both the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee were critical 
of this article. Opinion of the European Parliament, at art. 14; and Opinion of the Economic 
and Social Committee, at 13. See Conlon, supra note 34, at 354-5; and Lang, supra note 34, at 
364-65. 
78. See generally Draft Statute for European Companies. 
79. Draft Statute for European Companies, arts. 71(1) & 81(1). 
80. Id. arts. 71(2) & 81(2). 
81. Draft Statute for European Companies, art. 71(1). The German law formulates the 
standard of care for members of the management board of an AG as the care of an ordinary 
and conscientious manager. E. ERCKLENTZ, supra note 32, at 20.9. A comparable standard, 
that of a normally conscientious overseer, would apply to members of the board of overseers 
(supervisory board). E. ERCKLENTZ, supra note 29, at 161. The Draft Statute for European 
Companies does not follow this approach. Article 71 dealing with the management board 
contains a standard of care, but Article 81, the analogous provision for the supervisory board 
does not. 
82. Draft Statute For European Companies, art. 80(1). 
83. The Economic and Social Committee raised this issue in its Opinion together with the 
point that the term "wrongful" ought not include a business judgment which in hindsight is 
considered to be wrong. Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, at 13. See also 
Conlon, supra note 34, at 355. 
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in the Article. The European Parliament suggested that a clause be ad-
ded to Article 14(2) to the effect that a member can exonerate himself if 
he can prove "that no fault is attributable to him personally, or that his 
actions may be reasonably excused."84 (emphasis added). The Commis-
sion indicated in the Explanatory Memorandum that this modification 
was not included because it was superfluous. The Memorandum states: 
"[I]f the member's action may reasonably be excused, no fault will be 
attributed to him."85 The reasonableness of the member's conduct could 
thus be considered under Article 14(1), which directs member states to 
ensure that compensation is made for the wrongful acts of a company's 
members. 86 The member's conduct would also be considered separately 
under Article 14(2), the exoneration provision, as part of the member's 
attempt to prove that no fault is attributable to him. Alternatively, if a 
breach or wrongful act is equated with a fault, then by the Commission's 
interpretation, the reasonableness of the conduct must be considered in 
determining a breach or wrongful act. The balance of Chapter III sets 
forth the means by which civil liability can be enforced. Proceedings to 
enforce the liability may be brought on behalf of the company on request 
of the shareholders at the general meeting, 87 by a derivative action by the 
shareholders88 or by creditors of the company. 89 
Chapter IV of the Amended Proposal pertains to the one-tier man-
agement system but contains essentially the same provisions as Chapter 
III. Ostensibly it addresses the concerns expressed over the imposed 
two-tier structure mandated in the Original Proposal.90 However, it is 
clear that this Chapter represents little, if any compromise by the Com-
mission on the issue. Chapter II of the Amended Proposal allows mem-
ber states to offer affected companies a choice between the "two tier 
system organized in accordance with Chapter III and a one tier system 
(administrative organ) in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 
IV."91 However, the very structure of this sentence reflects the begrudg-
ing nature of this concession. The first part of the sentence reads: "The 
member States shall provide that the company be organized according to 
a two-tier system in accordance with Chapter III."92 The second half of 
the sentence appears inconsistent with the first, allowing the states to 
84. Opinion of the European Parliament, at art. 14(2). 
85. Explanatory Memorandum, at 10. 
86. See supra note 65. 
87. Amended Proposal, art. 15. 
88. Amended Proposal, art. 16. 
89. Amended Proposal, art. 19. 
90. See supra notes 35-37, and accompanying text. 
91. Amended Proposal, art. 2(1). 
92. Id. 
1985] FIFTH COMPANY LAW DIRECTIVE 231 
offer companies the choice between a two-tier and a one-tier system.93 
Upon reading Chapters III and IV, it becomes apparent that the choice is 
really not a choice at all between the two systems. Instead the one-tier 
system prescribed in Chapter IV is strikingly similar to the two-tier sys-
tem described in Chapter III. 94 
Chapter IV adopts the term "administrative organ" for the board. 
In the first article of the chapter, this administrative organ is quickly 
divided into its "executive" and its "non-executive" members.95 It ap-
pears that these terms were substituted by the Commission for the man-
agement and supervisory organ terminology found in Chapter III. 96 
There appears to be little if any substantive difference between the 
functions of the executive and non-executive members of the administra-
tive organ in a one-tier system and those members of the management 
and the supervisory organ in a two-tier system.97 For example, Article 
21(a)(l)(a) provides that the company be managed by executive members 
of the administrative organ, under the supervision of its non-executive 
members. From the language of this article, it is not clear how the com-
plete division of responsibilities is to take place within the context of one 
board.98 The Commission's statement in the Preamble that even in the 
one-tier structure the board is often comprised of executive members 
who manage and non-executive members may be factually correct. The 
Commission, drawing on this observable fact, proceeds in Article 21 
(a)(l)(a) of the Amended Proposal to assign to these two groups the 
functions associated with the management and supervisory organs of the 
two-tier system. National legislation presently charges the entire board 
with the same legal responsibilities.99 The civil liability section, 
93. /d. In the Explanatory Memorandum, the Commission states that in Article 2(1) it 
adopted the recommendation of the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Com-
mittee. Explanatory Memorandum, at 6. Article 2 as amended by the European Parliament is 
essentially the same as Amended Proposal, art. 2(1). As drafted Article 2(1) does leave the 
member states free to either require the mandatory two-tier structure, or allow companies the 
choice of format. Thus, states such as Germany presently requiring the two-tier system would 
not be obligated to offer the choice. 
94. Compare Amended Proposal, Chapter IV with Amended Proposal, Chapter III. 
95. Amended Proposal, Chapter IV, Art. 1. 
96. The European Parliament also divided the administrative organ into two components 
in this manner. With the exception of the allocation of functions as stated in Amended Propo-
sal Article 21(a)(l)(a), the European Parliament's recommendations with respect to the one-
tier structure are very similar to the text of the Amended Proposal. 
97. Compare Amended Proposal, Chapter IV with Amended Proposal, Chapter III. 
98. The European Parliament's opinion suggested that the administrative organ be di-
vided into executive and non-executive members. It did not assign separate functions for each. 
Its division seems to be made only to provide for employee representation on the non-executive 
portion of the administrative organ. 
99. For discussions of the legal responsibilities of the management supervisory boards and 
the unitary board within national legal systems, see supra E. ERCKLENTZ, note 29, at 145-65, 
195-213, and L. GOWER, THE PRINCIPLES OF MODERN CoMPANY LAW (3rd ed. 1969), at 18-
20; see also supra, Lang, note 31, at 158-66. 
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Amended Proposal, Article 21(u), makes this assignment of functions 
and responsibilities even more troublesome. 
The provisions regarding the selection of the members of the admin-
istrative organ and the provisions for employee representation on the 
non-executive portion of the administrative organ 100 are the same as the 
pertinent provisions in Article 4 of Chapter III pertaining to employee 
participation in a two-tier system. Similarly, the conflicts of interest, the 
reporting by the executive members and the oversight by the non-execu-
tive members101 again parallel the Chapter III provisions. 
The civil liability section, Article 21(u), directly incorporates the 
Chapter III sections by succinctly providing that "[t]he provisions of Ar-
ticles 14-21 shall apply to the executive and non-executive members of 
the administrative organ."102 Only a few minor technical changes are 
made to reflect the one board model. For example, while Article 12 in 
Chapter III provides that the listed structural or economic changes can-
not be implemented without the approval of the supervisory organ, Arti-
cle 21(r) limits the supervisory organ's power by expressly making the 
administrative organ's responsibility to enact the listed changes non-
delegable. 103 
The second subject addressed by the Amended Proposal is the 
shareholder meeting. Chapter V contains detailed provisions regarding 
the procedures to be followed at the general meeting. In a format similar 
to corporation statutes in the United States, 104 this chapter sets forth the 
rules for conducting shareholder meetings. For example, Chapter Vex-
plains who may call the meeting, what the form and amount of notice 
should be, how to provide for proxy voting and shareholder lists, and 
what inspection rights and voting rights the shareholders have. 
While these provisions are similar to those found in corporation 
statutes in the United States, there are some notable differences. Corpo-
rate law in the United States does not generally allow a proxy holder to 
vote the shares differently from what the shareholders have instructed 
them to vote. 105 Article 28(1)(t) of the Amended Proposal, however, 
would allow the proxy holder to vote contrary to the shareholder's in-
structions if circumstances change after the instructions are given and 
100. Amended Proposal, arts. 21(b)(2), (d), (e) & (f). 
101. Amended Proposal, arts. 21(o), (p) & (r). 
102. Amended Proposal, art. 21(u). 
103. Compare Amended Proposal, art. 12 with Amended Proposal, art. 21(r). 
104. See e.g., DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8 (1983). 
105. See e.g., DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8 § 212 (1983) which governs the voting rights of stock-
holders, and places limitations on the use of proxies. See Hauth v. Giant Portland Cement Co., 
Del. Ch. 96 A.2d 233 (1953) (The person designated in a proxy has a fiduciary obligation to 
carry out the wishes of the stockholders to the best of his ability and vote in accordance with 
his wishes). 
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the interests of the shareholder might be detrimentally affected. 106 Ap-
parently, the proxyholder would be free to make the judgments trigger-
ing this right, limited only by the national legislation regarding proxy 
agents. 
Article 31 contains the special right of a shareholder to obtain infor-
mation. Although it is limited to requests made at the general meeting, 
the Article provides that a shareholder so requesting "shall be entitled to 
obtain correct information concerning the affairs of the company if such 
information is necessary to enable an objective assessment to be made of 
items on the agenda."107 Management must provide information unless 
to do so would seriously prejudice the company or the company is under 
a legal obligation not to divulge the information. 108 The effectiveness of 
this shareholder right is reenforced by Articles 42(d) and 43 which pro-
vide that resolutions adopted at a meeting where a shareholder was de-
nied information are voidable and give the shareholder the right to 
institute a proceeding to determine the voidability. 
. Pursuant to Article 32, only matters appearing on the agenda can be 
considered during the meeting, unless all shares are present or repre-
sented and no shareholders object to considering other matters. How-
ever, Article 32(3) allows the member states to deviate from this 
provision in their national legislation. The states may also allow the en-
forceability of the liability sections to be given consideration at the meet-
ing without prior notice. In the Original Proposal, the member states 
were authorized to deviate from the general rule and allow consideration 
of the dismissal of members of the management or supervisory organs, or 
of those responsible for auditing the accounts without prior notice. At 
the urging of both the European Parliament and the Economic and So-
cial Committee, this provision was deleted in the Amended Proposal. 109 
Article 35 qualifies the legitimacy of shareholders' voting agree-
ments. Subsections (a) and (b) provide that shareholder voting agree-
ments are void if they require that the shareholder always follow the 
instructions of or vote to approve propositions submitted by the company 
or one of its organs. A much more open-ended qualification is contained 
in Article 35(2) which provides that the agreement is void if the share-
holder agrees to vote in "a specified manner, or abstain, in consideration 
106. Amended Proposal, art. 28(f); see Conlon, supra note 34, at 355. Article 88(a)(1)(d) of 
the Draft Statute for European Companies is comparable. 
107. Amended Proposal, art. 31(1). The German law provides a comparison. See E. ER-
CKLENTZ, supra note 32, at 267. 
108. Amended Proposal, art. 31(3). In many jurisdictions in the United States the share-
holder's inspection right is circumscribed by procedural requirements. See e.g., DEL. CoDE 
ANN. tit 8, § 220. 
109. Opinion of the European Parliament, at art. 32(3)(a); Opinion of the Economic and 
Social Committee, at 14. 
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of special advantages."110 
The last substantive area included in the Amended Proposal con-
cerns the adoption and audit of the annual accounts. Chapter VI sets 
forth certain accounting principles and sets forth the required opinions of 
the auditors. It is unclear why these accounting principles are included 
in a directive which is primarily devoted to the treatment of the manage-
ment structure and certain shareholder rights. Other portions of Chap-
ter VI address shareholder's rights and are thus more germane to the rest 
of the directive. Article 48, for example, establishes the principle that the 
shareholders must adopt and approve the annual accounts at the general 
meeting. However, national legislation may allow companies using the 
two-tier structure to have their annual account adopted jointly by the 
management and supervisory organs. 
Article 49 requires that each year 5% of any profit be set aside in a 
reserve until the reserve equals at least 10% of subscribed capital. The 
general meeting is to determine how excess profits and losses are to be 
appropriated or treated. 111 The remainder of Chapter VI treats the ap-
pointment, qualifications and the procedures for issuing auditor's 
opinions. 
The Amended Proposal is of interest in a comparative sense because 
of its treatment of issues which are also of concern in the United States, 
and because of the effect the Amended Proposal could have on the Com-
munity and company law of the member states. On a more practical 
level, the question of the Amended Proposal's impact on present or fu-
ture United States business interests in member states should also be con-
sidered. As a general matter, the Amended Proposal would appear to 
have little direct impact on United States business interests due to the 
limitations on the type of companies to which it applies. Article 1 lists 
the corporate forms in each of the member states to which the Directive 
is applicable. Unlike the First Directive, which applies to large and small 
companies, both in the number of shareholders and in the amount of 
capital, the Fifth Directive is directed at large, broadly held compa-
nies. 112 In all member states there are several corporate forms providing 
110. Amended Proposal, art. 35(2). However, comparable United States corporation codes 
do not invalidate voting agreements so liberally. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 218(f) which 
permits the creation of explicit written voting agreements by which the parties agree on how to 
vote so long as the agreements are not otherwise illegal. 
111. The Draft Statute for European Companies also contained provisions requiring share-
holder approval of the annual accounts and appropriation of profits (declaration of dividends). 
Articles 83(1)(f) & (g). Again the German law is quite similar. See supra E. ERCKLENTZ, note 
32, at 439-56. 
112. Specifically, by Article 2 the Fifth Directive would apply to: the German aktiengesell-
schaft; the French, Italian and Luxemborgois societe anonyme; the Greek corporation; the 
Belgian societe anonyme/naamloze vennootschap; the Dutch naamloze vennootschap; and the 
Irish and United Kingdom public companies. 
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limitations on risk of loss or liability. In the past, subsidiary corpora-
tions or joint venture companies were typically not required to organize 
under the corporate forms to which the Directive applies. Assuming that 
the Directive was adopted, such investments could continue to be struc-
tured within a non-covered corporate form. Because the Amended Pro-
posal is substantially similar to the Original Proposal, it is bound to 
evoke a great deal of concern from within the Community. There is also 
no assurance that it will be adopted by the Council. The Amended Pro-
posal, as previously noted, contains some gaps which must be :filled by 
national legislation. Therefore, it is this supplemental, implementing leg-
islation that will be of greatest concern to all countries engaged in busi-
ness within the member states. 
